















Inter-Regional Price Convergence  






Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering 
Siberian Branch of the 





Paper presented at the  
59
th International Atlantic Economic Conference 
London, England 


























Inter-Regional Price Convergence and Market Integration in Russia 
 
Konstantin Gluschenko 
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering 
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Laventieva pr. 17, 630090 Novosibirsk, Russia 
Tel.: +7(3832)302548, fax: +7(3832)302580 
E-mail: glu@nsu.ru 





The paper analyzes a spatial pattern of goods market integration in Russia. By the spatial pattern is 
meant a state of each individual region of the country: whether it is integrated, and if not, whether 
it moves towards integration. Time series of the cost of the basket of 25 basic foods across 75 
regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with monthly frequency are used as the empirical stuff. With the 
use of nonlinear cointegration relationship that includes asymptotically subsiding trend capturing 
movement towards integration, 36% of Russian regions are found to be integrated with the 
national market; 44% of them are non-integrated, but are tending to integration with the national 
market; and 20% of regions are non-integrated and having no such a trend. It is found that σ-
convergence of regional prices takes place, implying that, despite the presence of regions not 
tending to integration, the predominant trend is the improvement in market integration.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The fast switch in the early 1990s from the centrally planned economy to that governed by 
the market principles, along with the political changes of that time, gave rise to dramatic regional 
fragmentation of the economic space of Russia. (Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) as well as 
Gluschenko (2003) discuss this process in more detail.) Therefore the creation – or recovery, if 
one would prefer to say so – of its single economic space became a severe problem challenging the 
country. It is even believed that a progress in solving this problem can be deemed as an important 
indication of successfulness of the Russian market reforms in general. 
A “core” of the single economic space is goods market integration. Results of Gluschenko 
(2003, 2004a) suggest that after a period of growing disconnectedness of the Russian market, the 
improvement of market integration started in 1994. Nevertheless, the market still is not near to 
completely integrated. Gluschenko (2004a) reveals a number of region-specific economic forces 
impeding integration, and Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) find macroeconomic and some 
other region-specific “anti-integration” forces. These papers find the temporal pattern of market 
integration in Russia, but they do not provide an insight into its spatial pattern, since, exploiting 
the cross-sectional approach, the results are averaged across regions of the country.  
It is to reveal the spatial pattern of goods market integration in Russia with the use of time 
series analysis that is the object of this study. By the spatial pattern is meant a state of each 
individual region of the country: whether it is integrated over a certain span of time, and if not, 
whether it moves towards integration. To model the movement towards integration (i.e., long-run 
inter-market price convergence), a new class of processes is introduced, which is intermediate 
between non-stationary and stationary ones, namely, non-stationary processes converging to 
stationarity over time. Such a process is represented by an autoregression with a non-linear, 
asymptotically subsiding trend. Two markets are deemed as tending towards integration with one 
another if their price differential satisfies this model. Otherwise it is tested whether the markets are 
integrated, using the conventional AR(1) model. (In both cases, a structural break characterizing 
the 1998 financial crisis in Russia is taken into account.) The source data for the empirical analysis 
are time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with 
monthly frequency, the average Russian cost being used as a representative of the national market. 
With the use of this methodology, 36% of Russian regions are found to be integrated with 
the national market; 44% of the regions are classed with those tending towards integration with the 
national market (the speed of convergence of regional prices to the average Russian level varying 
from 0.7% to 8.9% per month); and 20% of the regions are found to be non-integrated without a 
trend to integration. Since there are both regions tending and not tending to integration, the   3 
resulting trend of the entire market is a priori unclear. Examining the behavior of price dispersion 
(analyzing σ-convergence) sheds light on the issue. It is found that σ-convergence of regional 
prices takes place, implying that, despite the presence of regions not tending to integration, the 
predominant trend is the improvement in market integration; non-integrated regions do not 
demonstrate σ-divergence either. Comparing price dispersion in Russia and the US, it can be 
believed that by the late 1990s the Russian market has achieved the degree of integration 
comparable to that peculiar to the US market deemed the most integrated. 
The issue of market integration in transition economies has been the subject of a number of 
studies. Using cointegration analysis, Gardner and Brooks (1994), Goodwin et al. (1999), and 
Berkowitz et al. (1998) examine price dispersion among Russian cities in the early years of the 
transition (up to 1995). They find the Russian market weakly integrated, yet having encouraging 
signs of the improvement. (An early version of the paper by Berkowitz et al. (1998) was even 
titled “Transition in Russia: It’s Happening”.) Subsequently, Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) reveal 
the “Red Belt” as a culprit behind the segmentation of the Russian market; and then Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2001, 2003) estimate a segment of the integration trajectory for Russia (which is 
corroborated by Gluschenko (2003) who applies a different methodology). Cointegration and 
threshold relationships are analyzed across 7 regions of Western Siberia in Gluschenko (2001), 
and across 11 aggregated economic territories of Russia in Gluschenko (2002); both integrated and 
non-integrated region/territory pairs are found.  
Conway (1999), using data from 1993–1996 for three commodities, examines price 
convergence among four market locations within Kiev, Ukraine. He finds significant evidence of 
price convergence due to arbitrage by buyers and sellers at these markets, but sizeable and 
sustained divergences from the law of one price have remained as well. Cushman et al. (2001) 
examine the law of one price with 5 food prices over an 11-month period in Kiev, during the early 
1991–1992 period of Ukraine’s transition to independence. They compare these prices with the 
prices of similar goods in the US. Cointegration between Ukrainian and US price time series with 
a (linear) trend is deemed as an evidence of price convergence. Although the law of one price did 
not hold during the period, the commodity real exchange rates are found to have possessed 
deterministic trends that were in the direction of closing the initial considerable price gap.  
This paper also relates to papers analyzing internal market integration in advanced market 
economies, such as Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (1996), and Rogers (2002). More 
distantly, it relates as well to countless papers on analysis of the law of one price in the 
international context, and purchasing power parity, most sufficient of which were surveyed by 
Rogoff (1996), and Sarno and Taylor (2002). Noteworthy is also a relationship with the literature   4 
on empirics of economic growth (which is voluminous, too, see Durlauf and Quah, 1999).
1 The 
time series method of analyzing price convergence that is put forward in the paper seems to be 
useful to analyze, e.g., income convergence.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, methodology of the 
analysis and the data used are described. In Section 3, empirical results are presented. Conclusions 
are drawn in Section 4. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
2.1. Strategy of the analysis 
 
Perfect integration of a spatially separated goods market implies that there are no 
impediments to the movement of goods between all its spatial segments, i.e., regions of the 
country. In other words, perfectly integrated market operates like a single market despite its spatial 
separation.  Then the price of a (tradable) good across regions is uniform, i.e., the law of one price 
holds, inter-regional arbitrage maintaining the law to hold. Thus, the law of one price can be used 
as a theoretical benchmark for empirically analyzing internal market integration. 
As mentioned in Introduction, there are two stages in the evolution of market integration in 
Russia, namely, the early stage of progressive segmentation beginning in January 1992, and the 
late stage of improvement in integration beginning in about 1994. It is the late stage that is of 
interest in this study. It is hypothesized that the Russian goods market should eventually come to 
the final steady state of complete integration, that is, to the equality of prices across all regions. 
Currently, during the late stage of the integration evolution, the market may be believed to be in 
transition towards this steady state. Hence, it is expected that three groups of regions can exist at 
present: (a) integrated regions, i.e., those being in the steady state of equality of prices; (b) non-
integrated regions tending to integration, i.e., those in which prices are converging to some 
common level; and, maybe, (c) non-integrated regions having no such a trend. For brevity, 
hereafter regions from the second group are referred to as “regions tending to integration”, and 
regions from the third group are referred to as simply “non-integrated regions.” 
In the above context, the term convergence of prices becomes ambiguous. In fact, 
considering region groups (a) and (b), two fundamentally different concepts of convergence come 
into collision with one another. Let prt and pst denote the price of a good in regions r and s at time 
t∈[0, T], and prst = prt/pst. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the concepts; the thin lines in 
the figure depict actual dynamics of prices; and the thick lines represent their theoretical (long-
                                                            
1 Michael Beenstock has pointed out the resemblance of the convergence problem in economic growth and the 
problem of price dynamics.    5 
run) trajectories. 
 
In words, these two concepts can be described as follows: 
(I) Figure 1(a) implies that regions r and s fall into group (a) of those being in the spatial 
equilibrium; price disparities between regions are merely random shocks dying out over time. In 
other words, prices fluctuate around parity, permanently tending to return to it. This is just the case 
that the literature on the law of one price and purchasing power parity (PPP) deals with, calling it 
“convergence to the law of one price/PPP.” That is, the term “convergence” relates to shocks, 
implying their convergence to zero. In fact, this characterizes the short-run behavior of prices, 
while their long-run behavior is described by the trajectory 
prt/pst = 1,  t = 0,…,T.                           (1) 
Thus, such a concept can be called “short-run convergence.” 
(II) Figure 1(b) implies that regions r and s fall into group (2) of those tending towards the 
spatial equilibrium:  




p p .                            (2) 
(In the figure, prices in s are catching prices in r up.) In general, the price disparity permanently 
diminishes over time; and the prices fluctuate around this general trend due to random shocks. 
This is the case that the literature on economic growth deals with (regarding income data), calling 
it simply “convergence.” This time, in the short run, prices converge to the long-run trajectory 
(i.e., random deviations from it dye out over time), while this trajectory itself converges to the 
parity line prt/pst = 1 in the long run. It is the latter trend that is of main interest. Here, the term 
p 













(a) Short-run convergence (ordinary cointegration) 
(b) Long-run convergence (catching-up) 
Figure 1. Two concepts of price convergence 
prt/pst 
prt/pst   6 
“convergence” relates to prices themselves, implying (long-run) convergence of their differences 
to zero over time. Hence, such a concept can be called “long-run convergence.” 
In (1) and (2), the absolute price parity is taken as the steady state. It implies perfect 
integration which is not a common instance in the real world. For example, Engel and Rogers 
(1996) as well as Parsley and Wei (1996) find price dispersion among US cities to depend strongly 
on distance. Then there may be a persistent (equilibrium) difference in prices between r and s that 
is induced by “natural” market frictions such as physical distance and difficult access to a number 
of regions. And so, it would be more realistic to relax the criterion for market integration, allowing 
for such market frictions. In that case the relative price parity would be dealt with, substituting 1 in 
the right-hand side of (1) and (2) for an arbitrary constant ratio of prices, αrs. (Such a relaxation 
has been implemented in Gluschenko (2003, 2004a), exploiting cross-section analysis.) 
The trouble is that this α reflects both the effect of “natural”, irremovable, market frictions 
(which is compatible with the notion of integration) and the effect of artificial, transient, ones 
impeding market integration. This can be formalized as, e.g., α = αe(Lrs)⋅αf, where αe is the effect 
of transportations costs proxied by distance between regions r and s, Lrs, and αf is the effect of 
“anti-integration forces.” But in the context of pairwise time series analysis, there is no way to 
separately identify αe and αf. That is why the strict version of the law of one price is adopted as 
the benchmark of integration, any deterministic difference in prices interpreting as an indication of 
non-integration. Certainly, the degree of Russia’s market integration may be understated to some 
extent because of this. Therefore, it is checked in Section 3 whether non-integration is 
predominantly due to persistent inter-regional differences in prices, or to (stochastic or 
deterministic) divergence of prices.  
Testing for equality of prices (or price levels) – i.e., for relationship (1) – is the conventional 
exercise in papers on the law of one price and PPP. Denoting Prt ≡ ln(prt), Pst ≡ ln(pst), and Prst ≡ 
ln(prt/pst), it is tested whether regional prices Prt and Pst are cointegrated with predetermined 
cointegrating vector (1, –1), or, what is the same, whether price differential Prst is stationary. 
However, providing the “all or nothing” answer, this traditional approach is impotent in revealing 
a transitional case (2), that is, the case when a process {Prst}t=0,…,T is not stationary, but tends to a 
stationary one over time. Using conventional cointegration analysis, such a process would be 
recognized simply as non-stationary, giving no way to separate groups (b) and (c). 
There exist a few approaches to deal with this problem. The issue of (long-run) convergence 
is extensively addressed to in the economic growth literature; see a survey by Durlauf and Quah 
(1999).  
The most widely used concepts of convergence in the economic growth context are called σ-  7 
convergence and β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Reformulating in terms of 
prices, σ-convergence occurs if the cross-sectional dispersion of prices, measured, e.g., by the 
standard deviation σ(Pt), tends to decrease over time: σ(Pt)/σ(Pt–τ) < 1. In the same terms, if the 
regression of Prt on Pr,t–τ yields β < 1, where β is the coefficient on Pr,t–τ, then it is said that the 
data set exhibits β-convergence. Being tested cross-sectionally, both approaches yield a spatially 
aggregated result, and not a spatial pattern of convergence. And so, they are not able to solve the 
problem put in this paper. 
There are a few papers exploiting a time series concept referred to as forecast convergence 
by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), or stochastic convergence by Carlino and Mills (1996). The 
former paper defines convergence essentially in the same way as (2), but tests for convergence 
with the use of (1), applying standard cointegration analysis. Thus, in fact, the authors do not deal 
with long-run convergence as such, examining only whether it completed by the beginning of a 
given time span (i.e., they test for short-run convergence). Carlino and Mills (1996) employ a 
cointegration relationship with a deterministic linear trend. Provided that the trend is directed 
towards zero inter-location difference, stationarity around this trend is supposed to be an evidence 
of convergence. (Cushman et al. (2001) apply a similar way to analyze price convergence.) 
However, since this test is not compatible with (2), such evidence is rather unreliable: having 
reached the zero value, the difference would be driven further by the linear trend, increasing again 
(in absolute value) with the opposite sign.  
Indeed, to analyze convergence in progress, a time series model should include a zero-
directed trend. However, in order to satisfy (2), the trend should asymptotically subside, which 
leads to a nonlinear cointegration relationship. It is this approach that is adopted in this paper. 
Convergence of prices to equality is modeled as 
prt/pst = 1 + γe
δt, δ<0                             (3) 
(to economize notations, the region indices for parameters – as well as for disturbances below – 
are suppressed).  
Parameter  δ defines the convergence speed. The sign of γ shows the direction of 
convergence: with γ < 0, prices in r catch up with prices in s, increasing over time faster that those 
in s; with γ > 0, the prices in r are rising slower than in s. Per se, γ is the initial – at t = 0 – 
deviation of prices from parity. With γ = 0, (3) degenerates into (1), which means convergence of 
prices to have completed by the beginning of the time span under consideration, hence, the law of 
one price holds for regions r and s.  
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2.2. Econometrics 
 
To derive a testable version of the theoretical relationship (3), stochastic disturbances, νt, are 
taken into account, supposing them to be a (first-order) autoregressive process: 
Prst = ln(1 + γe
δt) + νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,                     (4) 
where εt is white noise, and γ, δ, and λ are parameters to be estimated; hereafter, t = 1,…,T. 
Substituting the second equation in (4) into the first one gives the nonlinear model to be estimated 
and tested: 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + γe
δt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + γe
δ(t – 1)) + εt.                 (5) 
It is tested whether time series {Prst} has no unit root, i.e., that the process is stationary 
around the trend, and if so, whether the time series does have a subsiding trend, i.e., γ ≠ 0 and       
δ < 0. That is, the hypotheses tested are H1: λ = 0 (against λ < 0); H2: γ = 0 (against γ ≠ 0); and H3: 
δ ≥ 0 (against δ < 0). Throughout the paper, the 10% significance level is adopted.  
To test hypothesis H1, the Phillips-Perron test is performed, which eliminates serial 
correlation from the residuals, using the Newey-West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection 
method with the Bartlett spectral kernel. (This test is chosen in order not to lose degrees of 
freedom through adding additional lags to the regression itself.) However, the test statistic (which 
is the t-ratio of λ) for an AR(1) process of the form (5) is not documented in the literature. 
Therefore, to derive p-values of the test, the empirical distribution of this statistic under the null 
hypothesis was estimated, implementing a large set of simulations. Appendix provides details as 
well as results obtained.  
If the unit root in (5) is rejected, hypotheses H2 and H3 are tested; provided the stationarity 
of the time series, the ordinary t-test is valid for this. If either of them is not rejected, this means 
that there is no deterministic trend of the given form in the time series (or – when δ > 0 – that the 
trend is not subsiding). In such an event, as well as in the case of non-rejection of unit root, it is 
tested whether the process is governed by law (1), as described below. 
The joint rejection of H1, H2 and H3 is interpreted as evidence that the time series has 
asymptotically subsiding trend, fluctuating around it. Hence, prices in r and s are converging to 
equality, and these regions are classed with ones tending to integration. Parameter λ is interpreted 
as an indicator of the speed of dying out deviations from trajectory (3) that are caused by random 
shocks; tHL = ln(0.5)/ln(1 + λ) defines the half-life time of the deviations. (With a unit root, λ = 0, 
tHL = ∞, meaning that the effect of random shocks is permanent; hence, there is no return to 
trajectory (3). With no autocorrelation, λ = –1, tHL = 0; hence, the return to trajectory (3) is 
instantaneous).   9 
Using the same way as above, a testable version of (1) is arrived at: 
Prst = νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,                         (6) 
or 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + εt,                           (7) 
which is the conventional AR(1) model. 
The hypothesis tested is whether the time series has unit root, H′1: λ = 0 (against λ < 0). The 
same procedure as for testing H1 is used, taking MacKinnon’s (1996) p-values for regression 
without intercept and trend. The rejection of the unit root is interpreted as evidence that the time 
series fluctuates around zero, that is, around equality of prices in r and s. Therefore, these regions 
are classed with integrated ones. If H′1 is not rejected, regions are deemed as non-integrated. 
Noteworthy are different roles of parameters γ and δ vs. parameter λ. The first two 
characterize the long-run behavior of a relative-price trajectory, while λ defines the short-run 
properties of adjustment toward this trajectory (which is, in the degenerate case of AR(1), the 
straight line along the time axis, representing the price parity). 
There is a peculiarity in price dynamics in Russia: a number of regional price time series 
contain a structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis. The period of break is not 
uniform across regions, varying from 1998:08 through 1999:02. With such a break, a time series 
might appear to have a (spurious) deterministic trend, so biasing the inference towards non-
rejection of a trend in (5), and towards non-rejection of a unit root in (7). To avoid this, (5) and (7) 
are augmented for breaks, taking the forms 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + (γ + γBBθt)e
δt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + (γ + γBBθ,t–1)e
δ(t – 1)) + εt,          (5
*) 
and 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + γB(Bθt – (λ + 1) Bθ,t–1) + εt,                    (7
*) 
where Bθt is the structural change dummy such that Bθt = 1 if t < θ, and zero otherwise.
2 The period 
of break is found by estimating (5
*) and (7
*) for θ = 1998:08,…,1999:02, and choosing its value 
that yields the least sum of squared residuals.  
In (5
*), the sign of γ + γB shows the direction of convergence before the break; and that since 
the break point is shown by the sign of γ. This time γ can equal zero; such an event implies that 
                                                            
2 Specification (7
*) is derived from (6), augmenting the first equation in (6) with the break variable. It differs from the 
classical regression used to test for a unit root in the presence of structural break as specified by Perron (1990). (Note 
that the common use of two dummies to characterize the break, the level dummy and the pulse one, is superfluous, 
since the pulse dummy taking the value of 1 if t = θ+1 and 0 otherwise can be represented as Bθt – Bθ,t-1.) The Perron-
type equation is a linear approximation of (7
*), allowing coefficients on Bθt and Bθ,t-1 to be independent. This leads to 
that parameter estimates, while being consistent, are not asymptotically efficient. Hence it can be expected that 
obtaining efficient estimates with the use of more adequate nonlinear equation (7
*) would provide a test with better 
properties. (See Gluschenko (2005) for details.)   10 
prices in r and s have become close to equal from the break date on. If the signs of γ and γB are the 
same, the break causes a price jump towards parity; and opposite signs imply the jump away from 
parity, provided that |γ| > |γB|. (The opposite inequality produces an exotic case of “overshooting”: 
the jump crosses the price parity line, thus changing the direction of convergence since the break 
point. There are no such cases among estimates obtained except for insignificant γs.) Equation (7
*) 
is constructed so that the price jump is always parity-directed, in order to test whether r and s have 
become integrated since the date of the structural change. Given γB > 0, the crisis caused price-
cutting in r; otherwise, it increased the relative price in the region. The hypotheses tested for (5
*) 
are the same as for (5) but H2 which is substituted for H
*
2: γB = 0 (against γB ≠ 0). For (7
*), a 
similar hypothesis denoted H
*′2 is tested in addition to H′1. Hypotheses H1 and H′1 are tested 
through the same procedure as above, however, using estimated empirical distributions of the unit-
root test statistic for time series with breaks; see Appendix.    
Thus, each time series {Prt} is analyzed as follows: 
Step 1. Model (5
*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H
*
2, H3 and are jointly rejected, 
regions  r and s are deemed as tending to integration, {Prst} containing a structural break. 
Otherwise, if the structural break is rejected, the analysis comes to Step 2, and if it is not (and H1 
or/and H3 is not rejected), the analysis continues from Step 3. 
Step 2. Model (5) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are jointly rejected, r 
and s are deemed as tending to integration. Otherwise, the analysis comes to Step 3. 
Step 3. Model (7
*) is estimated and tested. If there is no structural break (hypothesis H
*′2 is 
not rejected), the analysis comes to Step 4. Otherwise, if the unit root is rejected, r and s are 
deemed as integrated (since the period of the break), and if it is not, they are deemed as non-
integrated, {Prst} containing a structural break.  
Step 4. Model (7) is estimated and tested. If the unit root is rejected, r and s are deemed as 
integrated; otherwise, they are deemed as non-integrated. 
There are 75 series of regional prices for Russia, yielding 2775 region pairs. A standard way of 
reducing such a mass of pairwise comparisons in the literature on the law of one price and PPP is to take 
one of locations as a benchmark, as, e.g., in Parsley and Wei (1996), and Gardner and Brooks (1994), to 
name a few. This way is used in this paper as well. The national market as a whole is chosen as the 
benchmark (since, in the intra-national context, such a benchmark is believed to be natural and much 
more reasonable than an arbitrary region). Thus, integration of each region with the entire national 
market is analyzed, using only region-Russia pairs. That is, index s in the above relationships is fixed, 
and is set to s = 0, p0t denoting the price in Russia as a whole. (This price is close to the mean of prices 
across all regions, however, does not coincide with it; see the next section. For brevity, nevertheless,   11 
it will be referred to as “average Russian price”). And so, s is omitted hereafter; i.e., Prt denotes 
percentage difference in prices between region r and Russia as a whole: Prt ≡ ln(prt/p0t). 
Certainly, so reducing the set of pairs, the pattern becomes rougher and looses many details. 
However, it is believed to be in good agreement with the detailed pattern, based on Gluschenko 
(2002), where results of analysis across pairs of Russian economic territories are compared with 
those across the territory-Russia pairs. Theoretically, if two regions are integrated (or tending to 
integration) with the national market, then they should be integrated (tending to integration) with 
one another. Practically, this might fail, but only because of low power of unit root tests. There is a 
caveat though. There may be integration or long-run price convergence between two (and more) 
regions without integration with, or convergence to, the national market. Such a fact would imply 
that there are “price convergence clubs” among regional markets, an analog of convergence clubs 
in economic growth (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Using comparison with the 
benchmark rather than all pairwise comparisons, this issue remains open. It is to be clarified by 
additional analyses which is performed in Gluschenko (2004b, 2004c).   
When there are both regions tending to integration and non-integrated regions, the resulting 
trend of the entire market is a priori unclear. Then the behavior of the entire cross-section over 
time can shed light on the issue. It is reasonable to believe that if it exhibits σ-convergence, then 
the market as a whole is moving towards integration. The occurrence of σ-convergence in the case 
when the existence of non-integrated regions has been detected is evidence that the trend to long-
run convergence of prices prevails over the trend to divergence induced by those regions. To 
verify the separation of regions into three groups obtained through the time series analysis, σ-
convergence is also analyzed for each group. The group of regions tending to integration is 
expected to display σ-convergence; and the group of integrated regions is expected to have near-
constant σ. The group of non-integrated regions would show σ-divergence if non-integration is 
due to random walking or deterministic price divergence. However, if the reason of non-




The cost of the basket of 25 food goods (defined as the standard by the Russian statistical 
agency, Goskomstat, between January 1997 through June 2000) is used as a price representative 
for the analysis. This basket covers about one third of foodstuffs involved in the Russian CPI; but 
unlike the CPI, it has constant weights across regions and time; Goskomstat (1996) describes its 
composition. The costs of the basket (including retrospectively calculated for 1994-1996 and the 
second half of 2000) were obtained directly from Goskomstat.   12 
The price information has been collected in capital cities of the Russian regions; 75 of the 89 
regions of Russia are covered. The data are lacking for 10 autonomous okrugs, the Chechen 
Republic, and the Republic of Ingushetia. Besides that, two more regions are omitted. The city of 
Moscow is a “city-region”, being a separate subject of the Russian Federation, and at the same 
time it is the capital city of the surrounding Moscow Oblast; the same holds for St. Petersburg and 
the Leningrad Oblast. Therefore only these “cities-regions” are present in the sample, while the 
relevant surrounding oblasts are not. The data are monthly, spanning January 1994 through 
December 2000. Thus, the number of the time observations equals 84. 
Goskomstat calculates the cost of the basket for Russia as a whole as a weighed average of 
regional costs (using the ratio of region’s population in the population of Russia as the regional 
weight). Thus, the average Russian price does not coincide with the average over regions, though 
they are rather close to one another. This implies that the mean of relative prices prt/p0t can deviate 
– to some extent – from unity, and the mean of their logarithms can deviate from zero. 
There are missing observations in the time series used. The most of them occur in 1994. For 
this year, there are 42 missing observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. 
The remainder of the data set has only 9 missing observations. To fill the gaps, the missing prices 
are approximated, using the food component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value 
of price prt is the arithmetic mean of the nearest known preceding price inflated to t, and the 
nearest known succeeding price deflated to t; see Gluschenko (2003). For example, if an 
observation for one month is missed, its restored value looks like prt = (pr,t–1⋅πrt + pr,t+1/πr,t+1)/2, 
where πrτ is the  food CPI for month τ in region r. 
At last, a caveat with the data used should be mentioned. Retail prices embody region-
specific distribution costs which may cause violation of the law of one price even if wholesale 
prices do obey the law. Two ways of dealing with the problem are suggested by Gluschenko 
(2003). The first is to produce proxies of wholesale prices from retail prices. However, given 
monthly price time series, this way is not proper here, since data on distribution costs and retail-
wholesale margins are available only on a yearly basis. Thus, the second way is forced to follow, 
interpreting the spatial variation of distribution costs as an additional indication of poor 
integration. In fact, this means extending the notion of market integration, considering integration 
of the goods market as such in conjunction with integration of the related markets for distribution 
services and labor in retail trade.
3 (Indeed, organized crime responsible for a sufficient portion of 
inter-regional price dispersion in Russia acts both on the inter-regional level, forcing wholesale 
                                                            
3 Such a component of distribution costs like rent does not fit in with this. However, rent does not play a noticeable 
role in costs of the Russian trade, coming to about 1% in retail prices of goods.   13 
prices to rise, and on the local level, causing additional traders’ expenses raising distribution 
costs.) On the other hand, basing on results reported by Gluschenko (2003), it may be believed that 
patterns for retail and proxied wholesale prices would not sufficiently deviate from each other. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Table 1 summarizes results on integration of each individual region with the entire national 
market, which are obtained with the use of models (5
*), (5), (7
*), and (7). For a given region, the table 
reports results for one of these models, depending on which of them is accepted as describing the price 
behavior in this region. Reporting all parameters – λ, γ, γB, and δ – means acceptance of model (5
*); 
reporting λ, γ, and δ implies that (5) is accepted; thus, the region is deemed as tending to integration. 
If there are only λ and γB in the table, model (7
*) is accepted; and the only parameter λ is reported for 
(7). In the last two cases, the region is deemed as integrated if the unit root is rejected (the p-value of 
the unit root test is less than, or equal to, 0.1); otherwise the region is deemed as non-integrated. (The 
full set of estimates, i.e., results for each model, is provided in Gluschenko (2004b), Appendix B.)  
In the table, standard deviations are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively; p-values of the unit root test exceeding 10% are marked with 
bold italics. The horizontal borders separate the economic territories (ekonomicheskiy rayon) from 
one another. The composition of these territories and their names can be seen from the map in 
Figure 2 below. Regions are arranged geographically in the table, accordingly to their traditional 
ordering in Goskomstat’s publications until July 2000 (except for the Kaliningrad Oblast which is 
added to the Northwestern Territory).  
Of all the 75 regions, 27, or 36%, are deemed as integrated with the national market; and 
there are 15 (20%) non-integrated regions having no trend to integration. The minimal p-value of 
the unit root test among regions for which the unit root is not rejected in model (7) or (7
*) equals 
0.154. Thus, the results of testing can be believed as rather reliable in spite of low power of the 
unit root test. 
Taking the structural break into account sufficiently increases the number of integrated 
regions: there are eight of them, for which the unit root being rejected in (7
*) is not rejected in (7). 
Recalling that the break dummy equals 1 before the period of break, and 0 since it, this implies 
that these regions became integrated since the break. Hence, the 1998 financial crisis facilitated 
price equalizing among Russian regions, so it improved the pattern of regional integration. There 
is the only opposite case, in Saint Petersburg City, where the unit root is rejected in (7), and is not 
in (7
*). The 1998 crisis caused persistent rise in prices there as compared to the average Russian 
price; thus it called forth non-integration with the national market.   14 




test        
p-value 
λ  γ 
Structural break 
(γB)  δ 
  1. Rep. of Karelia  0.002  -0.423  (0.091)  0.186  (0.030)
***     -0.011  (0.004)
*** 
  2. Rep. of Komi
d    0.002  -0.439 (0.092)  0.005 (0.058)  0.227 (0.072)
*** -0.017  (0.006)
*** 
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl.
d  0.006  -0.428 (0.093)  0.195 (0.049)
*** 0.119  (0.039)
*** -0.014  (0.003)
*** 
  4. Vologda Obl.  0.000  -0.347  (0.089)      -0.043  (0.010)
***    
  5. Murmansk Obl.  0.154  -0.013 (0.009)     -0.207 (0.036)
***    
  6. Saint Petersburg City  0.299  -0.028 (0.024)     -0.183 (0.036)
***    
  7. Novgorod Obl.  0.000  -0.677  (0.106)      -0.034  (0.007)
***    
  8. Pskov Obl.  0.015  -0.181  (0.069)      -0.088  (0.021)
***    
  9. Kaliningrad Obl.  0.009  -0.173  (0.063)      -0.125  (0.030)
***    
10. Bryansk Obl.
a  0.066  -0.274 (0.083) -0.385 (0.108)
*** 0.147  (0.088)
* -0.018  (0.004)
*** 
11.  Vladimir  Obl.  0.017  -0.175 (0.067)     -0.122 (0.018)
***    
12.  Ivanovo  Obl.  0.001  -0.301 (0.084)     -0.090 (0.012)
***    
13. Kaluga Obl.  0.035  -0.239  (0.073)  -0.236  (0.075)
***     -0.042  (0.017)
** 
14. Kostroma Obl.  0.300  -0.078 (0.053)     -0.090 (0.028)
***    
15. Moscow City
a  0.667  -0.003 (0.013)     -0.070 (0.028)
**    
16. Oryol Obl.  0.015  -0.328  (0.085)  -0.313  (0.029)
***     -0.017  (0.003)
*** 
17.  Ryazan  Obl.  0.011  -0.153 (0.060)     -0.083 (0.019)
***    
18. Smolensk Obl.  0.000  -0.534  (0.101)  -0.090  (0.036)
** -0.133  (0.032)
*** -0.009  (0.004)
** 
19.  Tver  Obl.  0.000  -0.344 (0.082)     -0.118 (0.013)
***    
20. Tula Obl.  0.009  -0.299  (0.072)  -0.145  (0.053)
*** -0.082  (0.044)
* -0.016  (0.005)
*** 
21.  Yaroslavl  Obl.  0.000  -0.388 (0.088)     -0.077 (0.009)
***    
22. Rep. of Mariy El   0.330  -0.014 (0.015)           
23. Rep. of Mordovia  0.190  -0.015 (0.014)     0.125 (0.039)
***    
24. Chuvash Rep.
b   0.520  -0.012 (0.018)     -0.070 (0.027)
**    
25. Kirov Obl.  0.271  -0.050 (0.040)     -0.125 (0.030)
***    
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl.
c  0.051  -0.129 (0.057)     -0.099 (0.024)
***    
27. Belgorod Obl.  0.000  -0.470  (0.095)  -0.261  (0.027)
***     -0.012  (0.003)
*** 
28. Voronezh Obl.
a  0.000  -0.524 (0.098) -0.646 (0.142)
*** 0.249  (0.129)
* -0.029  (0.003)
*** 
29. Kursk Obl.  0.000  -0.471  (0.097)  -0.245  (0.025)
***     -0.015  (0.003)
*** 
30. Lipetsk Obl.  0.002  -0.468  (0.095)  -0.391  (0.071)
*** 0.134  (0.059)
** -0.015  (0.003)
*** 
31. Tambov Obl.
b  0.004  -0.362 (0.082) -0.176 (0.046)
*** -0.068  (0.033)
** -0.007  (0.003)
** 
32. Rep. of Kalmykia
 b    0.000  -0.548 (0.103) -0.045 (0.038)  -0.117 (0.037)
*** -0.012  (0.005)
** 
33. Rep. of Tatarstan  0.000  -0.614  (0.101)  -0.363  (0.058)
*** 0.077  (0.045)
* -0.008  (0.002)
*** 
34. Astrakhan Obl.  0.000  -0.701  (0.106)  -0.181  (0.020)
***     -0.025  (0.005)
*** 
35. Volgograd Obl.
d  0.000  -0.354 (0.084)     -0.099 (0.015)
***    
36. Penza Obl.  0.026  -0.279  (0.078)  -0.227  (0.027)
***     -0.010  (0.003)
** 
37.  Samara  Obl.  0.000  -0.376 (0.087)           
38. Saratov Obl.  0.014  -0.316  (0.082)  -0.178  (0.035)
***     -0.010  (0.005)
** 
39. Ulyanovsk Obl.  0.000  -0.577  (0.098)  -0.600  (0.068)
*** 0.152  (0.057)
*** -0.013  (0.002)
*** 
40. Rep. of Adygeya   0.000  -0.772  (0.108)  -0.366  (0.068)
*** 0.118  (0.059)
** -0.018  (0.003)
*** 
41. Rep. of Dagestan  0.000  -0.574  (0.101)  -0.122  (0.023)
***     -0.012  (0.005)
** 
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.   0.000  -0.231  (0.040)  -0.828  (0.079)
***     -0.093  (0.017)
*** 
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 0.158  -0.080 (0.044)           
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia   0.002  -0.445  (0.093)  -0.243  (0.032)
***     -0.025  (0.005)
*** 
45. Krasnodar Krai  0.000  -0.619  (0.105)  -0.430  (0.157)
*** 0.234  (0.140)
* -0.020  (0.005)
*** 
46. Stavropol Krai  0.000  -0.554  (0.100)  -0.165  (0.016)
***     -0.009  (0.003)
*** 
47. Rostov Obl.  0.000  -0.679  (0.106)  -0.185  (0.012)
***     -0.007  (0.002)
*** 
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan
 d    0.003  -0.240 (0.073)     -0.126 (0.024)
***    
49. Udmurt Rep.
c    0.009  -0.185 (0.064)     -0.129 (0.022)
***    
50. Kurgan Obl.
c  0.004  -0.131 (0.042)     -0.099 (0.031)
***    
51. Orenburg Obl.
b  0.011  -0.167 (0.060)     -0.110 (0.040)
***    
52. Perm Obl.  0.003  -0.372  (0.082)  0.160  (0.074)
**     -0.084  (0.039)
** 
53. Sverdlovsk Obl.  0.020  -0.292  (0.081)  0.119  (0.044)
***     -0.021  (0.012)
* 
54.  Chelyabinsk  Obl.  0.000  -0.698 (0.105)           
   15 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Region 
Unit root 
test        
p-value 
λ  γ 
Structural break 
(γB)  δ 
55. Rep. of Altai  0.000  -0.401  (0.088)             
56. Altai Krai  0.371  -0.023 (0.024)     0.077 (0.039)
*    
57. Kemerovo Obl.
e  0.000  -0.310 (0.069)     0.038 (0.015)
**    
58. Novosibirsk Obl.
e  0.000  -0.306 (0.070)     0.033 (0.013)
**    
59. Omsk Obl.
e  0.000  -0.578 (0.101) -0.910 (0.296)
*** 0.667  (0.282)
** -0.034  (0.005)
*** 
60.  Tomsk  Obl.  0.000  -0.252 (0.071)           
61.  Tyumen  Obl.  0.019  -0.138 (0.056)     0.068 (0.024)
***    
62. Rep. of Buryatia   0.003  -0.232 (0.073)     0.118 (0.022)
***    
63. Rep. of Tuva   0.228  -0.073 (0.046)     0.118 (0.044)
***    
64. Rep. of Khakasia
e    0.010  -0.200 (0.068)     0.038 (0.018)
**    
65.  Krasnoyarsk  Krai  0.008  -0.196 (0.066)     0.070 (0.026)
***    
66. Irkutsk Obl.
f  0.000  -0.342 (0.085)     0.147 (0.026)
***    
67. Chita Obl.  0.001  -0.450  (0.091)  0.298  (0.076)
*** 0.106  (0.054)
* -0.012  (0.003)
*** 
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)   0.513  -0.007 (0.013)           
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl.
f  0.003  -0.422 (0.091)  0.183 (0.045)
*** 0.148  (0.035)
*** -0.010  (0.003)
*** 
70. Primorsky Krai  0.040  -0.282  (0.081)  0.545  (0.060)
***     -0.008  (0.002)
*** 
71. Khabarovsk Krai
d  0.000  -0.571 (0.104)  0.298 (0.048)
*** 0.143  (0.034)
*** -0.007  (0.002)
*** 
72. Amur Obl.
c  0.003  -0.216 (0.063)     0.170 (0.028)
***    
73. Kamchatka Obl.
d  0.670  -0.005 (0.014)     0.179 (0.063)
***    
74. Magadan Obl.
d  0.347  -0.008 (0.010)     0.155 (0.051)
***    
75. Sakhalin Obl.
d  0.398  -0.010 (0.014)     0.137 (0.055)
**    
a Break in 1998:08; 
b Break in 1998:10; 
c Break in 1998:11; 
d Break in 1998:12; 
e Break in 1999:01; 
f Break in 1999:02. 
Not marked breaks are in 1998:09. 
 
The structural break is not rejected for 23 of 27 integrated regions. Of them, 15 regions have 
an upward break, i.e., the crisis forced rise in relative prices in these regions. All of them are from 
the European part of Russia. For eight regions, all from the Asian part of Russia (Siberia and the Far 
East), the break is downward, implying decline in relative prices. The same pattern is valid for non-
integrated regions (of which, the structural break is rejected only for three), with the only exception 
of the Republic of Mordovia. Thus, a consequence of the 1998 crises was coming prices in the 
Asian and European parts of Russia together, since prices in the former had been, as a rule, higher 
than in the latter before the crisis.  
The number of regions deemed as tending to integration with the national market is 33, or 
44% of the total. For the most part (24 regions of 33, or 73%), convergence is “upward”, i.e., 
catching-up the average Russian level by regions with low prices. The lowest starting price level, 
0.17 (=1 + γ + γB), among them has the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; the highest, 0.88, have the 
Republic of Dagestan. There are nine regions (or 27% of 33 regions) with “downward” 
convergence from the starting values of 1.12 in the Sverdlovsk Oblast and 1.54 in the Primorsky 
Krai as the low and high ends. All these are regions from the Northern Territory, Ural, Siberia, and 
the Far East. The only region with “upward” convergence on these territories is the Omsk Oblast 
(Western Siberia). The convergence speed expressed as a percentage (i.e., |e
δ – 1|) varies from 
0.7% (in the Tambov Oblast, Rostov Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai) to 8.9% (in the Kabardino-  16 
Balkar Republic) per month. Both values occur in regions with “upward” convergence; the range 
for “downward” convergence is 0.7% to 8.1%. There is strong positive correlation between the 
starting price gap, |γ + γB|, and the convergence speed in the case of upward convergence: the 
correlation coefficient equals 0.79. However, the pattern is reverse for the downward convergence: 
the greater the gap, the slower convergence; the correlation coefficient equals –0.52. 
The structural break is rejected for about a half of regions tending to integration, namely, for 
16, and is not for 17. The latter, in turn, are divided almost in half into those nine in which the break 
accelerated convergence (γ and γB have the same signs), having pushed prices towards the Russian 
average, and into eight regions where the break pushed prices away from the average Russian price 
(γ and γB with opposite signs), thus slowing convergence down. There are two regions, the republics 
of Komi and Kalmykia, with statistically insignificant γ, implying that prices there became near to 
the average Russian price since the break point on. Thus, these regions might be equally well 
classed as integrated.  
Neglecting the structural break would markedly distort the pattern. There are 12 cases, where 
the break is spuriously treated as a trend in (5). Then the relevant regions would be deemed as 
tending to integration while they are, in fact, either integrated or non-integrated without a trend 
towards integration. 
At last, there are 15, or 20% of the total, non-integrated regions having no trend to integration 
with the national market. While using models (7) and (7
*) augmented for the constant term, the unit 
root is not rejected only in two of these time series, namely, in those for the Magadan Oblast and the 
Sakhalin Oblast. This suggests that the reason of non-integration almost entirely is a constant 
nonzero difference of prices in a relevant region from the average Russian price rather than 
deterministic or stochastic price divergence. However, as discussed in Section 2.1, the existence of 
such a difference is taken as an indication of non-integration, since there is no way – in the context 
of the current analysis – to part irremovable price differences from removable ones caused by 
transitory impediments to integration. 
Overall, the 1998 crisis strongly affected across-region price dynamics. Nevertheless, the 
behavior of prices remained intact in a number of regions; the break is rejected for 23 regions (31% 
of all the 75). In these regions, the crisis caused a price spike, after which relative prices returned to 
the previous trajectory.  
The spatial pattern of market integration is presented in Figure 2.   
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  Regions integrated with the national market 
Thick lines are borders of economic territories, Roman numerals labelling the territories: 
I    Northern Territory 
II   Northwestern Territory 
III  Central Territory 
  Out of sample 
IV   Volga-Vyatka Territory 
V    Central Black-Earth Territory 
VI   Volga Region Territory 
  Non-integrated regions 
For numerical designations of regions, see Table 1. 
VII   North-Caucasian Territory 
VIII  Ural Territory 
IX    Western-Siberian Territory  
X   Eastern-Siberian Territory 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Geographical pattern of market integration  
From this figure, about a half of non-integrated regions are seen to concentrate in Central 
Russia. (In particular, non-integrated are all but one regions of the Volga-Vyatka Territory.) The 
pattern is rather surprising, as these are small regions with relatively short distances between them; 
besides that, this part of the country has developed transport infrastructure. It can be surmised that 
it is the atomistic administrative-territorial division of Central Russia that causes market 
segmentation: the more regional borders and governors, the more possibilities to impede inter-
regional trade and to diversify price policy across space. Curiously, the Ulyanovsk Oblast which 
maintained price regulations and subsidizing as long as up to the beginning of 2001 turns out to be 
tending to integration with the national market. The time series of Moscow prices has an “almost 
confident” unit root with its λ = –0.003. No correlation was found between non-integration and 
belonging to the “Red Belt” reported by Berkowitz and DeJong (1999), even in the European part 
of Russia. 
On the other hand, non-integrated regions are few in number in Siberia and the Far East. 
This corroborates a finding by Gluschenko (2003) that the Asian part of Russia excluding 
difficult-to-access regions is more integrated than European Russia. Another evidence seen in 
Figure 2 is the fact that all difficult-to-access regions (the Murmansk, Magadan, Sakhalin, and 
Kamchatka oblasts, and the Republic of Yakutia) are not integrated with the national market, a 
result that could be expected. It also supports findings by Gluschenko (2003, 2004a) that these 
regions markedly contribute to the overall disconnectedness of regional markets. 
In the full set of estimates, the unit root in (7) or/and (7
*) is rejected for 20 regions 
recognized as tending to integration. Thus, if the traditional approach to the time series analysis of 
integration were used, 47 regions, or 63%, would be classed as integrated with the national market, 
and 28 regions (37%) would fall into non-integrated ones.  
Among all the 75 estimates of model (5), there are 13 non-subsiding trends (δ > 0) implying 
divergence of prices, of which 10 have statistically insignificant δ, and two have insignificant 
factor γ. The only significant non-subsiding trend has Moscow. Taking account of the structural 
break, the number of positive estimates of δ increases to 20 in model (5
*), seven of them being for 
the same regions as in (5). Of these 20, 13 are insignificant, two are accompanied with non-
rejection of the unit root in the model, and one is with insignificant factor γ + γB. This time, δ for 
Moscow turns out insignificant, but instead, there are four significant non-subsiding trends for 
other regions. For two of relevant regions, the unit root is rejected in (7
*), and then only two cases 
of price divergence remain. This pattern gives grounds to believe that the trend to convergence of 
prices is predominant in the Russian market.   19 
Such a belief is supported by the dynamics of price dispersion plotted in Figure 3. The price 
dispersion is measured as σt, the standard deviation of prices normalized to the Russian average. 
The trajectory of σt demonstrates that price dispersion over all regions has been almost 
permanently decreasing, at least till the middle of 1999. This is a clear evidence of σ-convergence 
in 1994-2000, suggesting that the Russian market is moving towards integration.   
 
Additional trajectories for region groups provide insight into the pattern of changes in price 
dispersion. For comparability, standard deviations for region groups are computed with the use of 
the mean over all regions rather than that over a given group, i.e., price dispersion is measured 
relative whole of country; hence, it is not a within-group dispersion. With this, price dispersion 
over all Russian regions is a weighted average of group dispersions, σt = (R1/R)σt1 + (R2/R)σt2 + 
(R3/R)σt3, the weight being the share of the group in the total number of regions (σti denotes 
standard deviation of prices in region group i). The share of integrated regions is 0.36, that of non-
integrated regions is 0.20, and that of regions tending to integration is 0.44.  
The structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis is pronounced on the 
trajectories of σ. Its evident effect is reducing price dispersion. As expected, the main contribution 
to the decrease of price dispersion is due to regions tending to integration. Starting with σ roughly 
equaling that for the whole of the country in the beginning of the period, the gap between them 
quickly widens over time. For integrated regions, price dispersion is the lowest and is near-
Figure 3. Standard deviations of the log relative cost of the 25-food basket   20 
constant, fluctuating around the level of 0.11 before the 1998 crisis, and around the level of 0.07 
since January 1999.  
The most price dispersion is inherent in non-integrated regions. The trajectory for this group 
has the most pronounced structural break reducing the group σ by about a quarter. However, the 
main contribution to this is due to difficult-to-access regions. Being computed for non-integrated 
regions excluding difficult-to-access ones, the trajectory of σ appears to have no break. Contrary 
to the theoretical expectations this subgroup does not exhibit increasing price dispersion. The 
reason is the fact that there is almost no price divergence in the Russian market (indeed, the full set 
of estimates provide only two clear evidences of price divergence). Regions deemed as non-
integrated are for the most part those having a persistent difference from the average Russian 




Using the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial 
pattern and trends of market integration in Russia in 1994-2000 have been analyzed. The results 
obtained evidence poor market integration: with the strict law of one price as the benchmark, only 
about one third of Russian regions can be deemed as integrated with the national market. 
Nevertheless, encouraging evidence is found of trends towards more integration. About a half of 
Russian regions are classed with those tending to integration. Besides that, it is inconceivable that 
the obtained pattern of integration overstates shortcomings of the Russian market, ignoring such 
an irremovable market friction as spatial separation of regions.  
Overall, the results unambiguously suggest that the Russian market has been moving 
towards integration. (An exception is the group of the difficult-to-access regions, which is hardly 
involved in this movement. However, the difficult access is one more irremovable market friction; 
Non-integration of these regions owes to geographical features of the country rather than to some 
economic policy, either national or regional.) More exactly, it moved until about the end of 1999. 
Then why it stopped? It seems that by that time price convergence in Russia completed, having 
reached a “natural” limit of market integration.  
  Reasoning from the theoretical benchmark of complete integration, the situation is not 
brilliant, as one fifth of regions neither are integrated nor tend to become such. But let us compare 
it with an actual benchmark: the United States, whose market is deemed to be the most integrated.  
Figure 4 provides such a comparison. 
In this figure, the data on the 25-item basket are supplemented with the data on a new, 33-
item basket, introduced since June 2000; the source of the data is Goskomstat (2000-2003). The   21 
costs of the baskets are normalized to the cost for Russia as a whole. Judging from the second half 
of 2000, for which data on both baskets are available, standard deviations of their costs, calculated 
over Russia without difficult-to-access regions, are close to one another. ACCRA (1994-2002) 
data on the relative (to the US average) costs of the 27-item grocery basket across about 300 US 
cities with quarterly frequency are used as a US price representative (see the source for the 
composition of the basket).  
 
Firstly, the figure confirms the conclusion that price convergence in Russia is near to be 
completed: in recent years, price dispersion remains rather stable, fluctuating about the level of 
0.1. And secondly – what is the most important thing – price dispersion across Russia in the last 
years is comparable with that across US. 
This finding corroborates Shleifer and Treisman (2003) who conclude that by the late 1990s 
Russia has become a typical middle-income capitalist country. (As they write, “Russia’s economic 
and political systems remain far from perfect. However, their defects are typical of countries at its 
level of economic development”.) Moreover, regarding market integration, the behavior of the 







Figure 4. Price dispersion across Russia and the US   22 
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APPENDIX 
Unit root test statistics for models with nonlinear trend and/or break 
To obtain p-values of the t-ratio of λ that is used in the unit root test for Equation (5), the 
equation has been estimated over each of 500,000 simulated random walks with t = 0,…,83, thus 
obtaining the empirical distribution of this t-ratio (referred to as τNL). Table A1 reports some 
critical values of these estimated statistics. For comparison, MacKinnon’s (1996) values for the 
Dickey-Fuller regressions with no constant term, with constant, with constant and trend, and with 
constant, trend and trend squared (τ0, τc, τct, and τctt statistic, respectively) for the sample size of 
83 are reported as well. 
 
Table A1. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics 
Significance 
level 
τNL  τ0  τc  τct  τctt 
0.1%  -4.820 -3.363 -4.251 -4.808 -5.258 
1% -3.963 -2.593 -3.511 -4.072 -4.516 
5% -3.310 -1.945 -2.897 -3.465 -3.906 
10% -2.978 -1.614 -2.586 -3.159 -3.598 
20% -2.585 -1.228 -2.223 -2.804 -3.242 
 
     
                                (a) Probability densities                                                      (b) Cumulative distributions 


























Fig. A2. Left-hand tails of cumulative distributions of τ-statistics 
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Empirical distributions for the case of structural break in time series have been computed in 
a similar way. Table A2 reports some critical values of these estimated statistics, denoted τNL(θ) 
and τ0(θ), and Figure A3 demonstrates the left-hand tails of the their cumulative distributions. For 
comparison, selected τ-statistics from the above table are included. 
 
Table A2. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for models with structural break 
Model with nonlinear tend and break (5
*) 
τNL(θ) with θ =  Significance  
level  τNL 
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02 
τct  
0.1%  -4.820 -4.853 -4.861 -4.875 -4.889 -4.882 -4.872 -4.872 -4.808 
1%  -3.963 -4.034 -4.045 -4.052 -4.055 -4.064 -4.058 -4.065 -4.072 
5%  -3.310 -3.357 -3.369 -3.372 -3.376 -3.379 -3.378 -3.381 -3.465 
10% -2.978  -3.017 -3.027 -3.030 -3.035 -3.036 -3.038 -3.039 -3.159 
20% -2.585  -2.622 -2.630 -2.633 -2.635 -2.638 -2.640 -2.641 -2.804 
Model without trend and with break (7
*) 
τ0(θ) with θ =  Significance  
level  τ0 
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02 
τc 
0.1%  -3.363 -3.639 -3.644 -3.644 -3.661 -3.655 -3.645 -3.673 -4.251 
1%  -2.593 -2.720 -2.717 -2.728 -2.723 -2.732 -2.729 -2.742 -3.511 
5%  -1.945 -1.976 -1.979 -1.979 -1.980 -1.982 -1.983 -1.986 -2.897 
10% -1.614  -1.621 -1.624 -1.624 -1.624 -1.627 -1.627 -1.628 -2.586 


























Fig. A3. Left-hand tails of cumulative distributions of τ-statistics for models with break 
 
As could be expected, the cumulative distributions of τ for the model with break and without 
trend lie between those for the linear models without and with the constant term. With this, they 
are close the Dickey-Fuller distribution of τ0. The distributions for the model with nonlinear trend 
and break lie to the left of that for the relevant model without break. They are rather close to the 
latter, and lie to the right of the distribution for the model with linear trend, except for low p-
values (0.015 and lesser). In both cases, distributions for different break dates θ are very close to 
one another, and are hardly distinguishable in the figure. 
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